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LAWRENCE A. HERZOG*

International Boundary Cities: The
Debate on Transfrontier Planning
in Two Border Regions**
ABSTRACT
For the first time in modern history, large-scalecities are evolving
along the borders of nation-states. The settlement pattern is one in
which urban residents on either side of the boundary are enmeshed
in a singularfunctional region, or "transfrontiermetropolis." Ecological resources are shared within these common transboundary
living spaces. Environmentalproblems such as sewage contamination, hazardous waste spillage, or air pollution are also shared.
While cooperative transborderplanning has been proposed as a
means for resolving these problems, it is not clear that such an
approachworks. This articleexamines the transfrontierpolicy debate
for two important boundary regions: Western Europe and the U.S.Mexico border.Western Europe'srecordof transfrontiercooperation
is critically reviewed. While the volume of transfrontierplanning
projects has mushroomed there during the past decade, many structural obstacles to long term cooperation remain. Along the U.S.Mexico border, strong political-economicpolaritieshinder the formation offormal, bi-lateralborderpolicy-making mechanisms of the
Western European variety.
BACKGROUND
This article considers the dilemma of managing densely populated
regions along international borders. Most boundary zones separating nation states tend to be devoid of cities. Indeed, a large proportion of the
world's more than one hundred thousand miles of international borders
traverses deserts, mountains, and other uninhabitable terrain. The longest
boundary in the world, separating China and the Soviet Union, houses
few important urban settlements along its 5,965 miles. Many of the other
large international borders in Asia, Africa, South America and parts of
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North America (the Canadian-United States border), and Europe (northern
and eastern national borders) also lack significant urban settlements.
These facts are consistent with the original thinking of statesmen and
diplomats who prepared the treaties leading to the demarcation of boundaries during the period of nation-state formation in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. They also parallel the work of scholars who
studied boundaries before 1950. The prevailing wisdom, both in and
outside academia, has been that boundaries represent a protective shield
between nation-states. Because they were the primary line of national
defense in the land-based conflicts prior to the second world war, boundaries attracted considerable attention from scholars concerned with their
role in international security.2 The military functions of boundary zones
before 1950 led one scholar to write that the "functions of boundaries
are in general negative rather than positive" and they "cannot promote
trade or human intercourse." 3
Early twentieth century social science characterized boundary areas as
"buffer regions" between nation states.4 This meant that, from an economic development or planning point of view, boundary regions were
viewed as "unstable. " Two important location theorists, Walter Christaller
and August Losch, argued that international boundaries distorted "normal" trading patterns, and created uncertainties and problems both for
consumers and retailers.' In The Location of Economic Activity, Harvard
economist Edgar Hoover6 devoted several chapters to "The Locational
Significance of Boundaries." Hoover claimed that the divergent laws,
customs, cultural values and national policies partitioned along political
boundaries interfered with the transborder movement of labor, commodities, capital and enterprise. Thus, he argued, boundary areas lacked the
conditions necessary for economic development.
In general, researchers found boundary regions to be suboptimal locations for valuable national resources or investments. They best served
as institutionalized buffer zones, where national governments could monitor and regulate the transboundary flow of people and goods from neighboring states. Because border locations repelled economic activity, it was
unlikely that one would find significant populations living along the edges
of national territory. The world of sparsely inhabited boundaries that
evolved before 1950 therefore conformed with the views of border scholars up to that time.
1. See S. Boggs, International Boundaries 211 (1940).
2. N. Spykman, Frontiers,Security and InternationalOrganization, 32 Geographical Rev. 43647 (1942).
3. S. Boggs, supra note 1, at 11.
4. Id.
5. W. Christaller, Central Places in Southern Germany (1966); A. Losch, The Economics of
Location (1954).
6. E. Hoover, The Location of Economic Activity 215-237 (1948).
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CITIES AND PLANNING PROBLEMS ON INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARIES: WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER ZONE
Since 1950, two important world regions have spawned the growth of
large and medium-sized international border cities: Western Europe and
the United States-Mexico border area. By 1980, many important West
European settlements had evolved along the Swiss, French, German,
Belgian, Dutch, and Italian borders. Among the salient border agglomerations today are: Geneva, Switzerland (335,000 population); Lille, France
(935,000); Strasbourg, France (373,000); Basel, Switzerland-Mulhouse,
France-Freiburg, Germany (766,117); Maastricht, Netherlands-Aachen,
Germany-Liege, Belgium (824,538); and Saarbrucken, Germany (188,763).'
Along the United States-Mexico border, by 1980, an equally formidable
array of large urban places had developed including: San Diego-Tijuana
(2.4 million); El Paso-Ciudad Juarez (1.2 million); Calexico-Mexicali
(460,000); McAllen-Reynosa (604,000); Laredo-Nuevo Laredo (386,000);
and Brownsville-Matamoros (450,000).'
In both regions, urban population growth along the boundary has assumed a unique form. Cities emerged on either side of the border line,
but, over time, the components that governed their growth9 became intertwined. Unique settlement configurations evolved, consisting of functinally unified, paired-city zones located around international borders.
Each zone might be called a "transfrontier metropolis." It is not surprising, therefore, that in both Western Europe and the United StatesMexico border region, urbanization of boundary zones has generated a
set of common planning problems or "transfrontier exteralities."' As
cities grow on one or both sides of the boundary, the spillover effects of
air pollution, sewage contamination, and toxic waste dumping diffuse
across the international border.
In Europe, these problems have taken on serious proportions in light
of two recent catastrophes that had transboundary effects: the nuclear
disaster at Chernobyl," and the chemical spill along the Rhine River in
Basel, Switzerland. 2 Other serious transborder planning problems include
the location of French nuclear plants along the border in the Alsace
region, 3 air pollution in industrialized border areas such as northern
7. European border urbanized region populations estimated by author from secondary sources:
D. Munro, Chambers World Gazetteer (1988); R. Mayne, Western Europe: A Handbook (1986).
8. U.S.-Mexico border metropolitan area estimates taken from L. Herzog, Where North Meets
South 50-51 (1990).
9. These components include economic base, transport structure and social composition.
10. See A. Sayer, The Economic Analysis of FrontierRegions, 5 W. Eur. Pol. 64-80 (1982).
11. Chernobyl, San Diego Union, Apr. 26, 1987, at C6, col. 1.
12. Los Angles Times, Nov. 30, 1986, at V2,col. 1.
13. See Lecture by H. Schmid, The Transfrontier Impact of Nuclear Power Stations in the Basel
Region, International Lawyers Reunion, New York (Aug. 28, 1981).
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France, the French-German-Swiss border zone at Basel, and the Ruhr
basin; 4 and the problem of frontier workers. 5 In the United States-Mexico
border region, salient transboundary problems have included: air and
water pollution; 6 sewage contamination; flooding and groundwater conflicts; 7 transboundary resource managment, including oil and gas;' 8 drug
enforcement; 9 and immigration policy.2"
The growth of boundary area cities in the United States-Mexico and
Western European cases, and the subsequent evolution of similar types
of planning problems2' suggest a rationale for broadly examining the
question of transfrontier policy and environmental and urban planning in
international boundary areas. Some scholars have emphasized the similarities between the United States-Mexico and Western European border
regions. 2 They envision a generic model of "transfrontier cooperation"
whereby authority is granted to municipal and regional governments contiguous with the international border. This authority is generated through
international treaties and manifested in the form of transborder decisionmaking entities such as planning commissions or regulatory agencies.
Duchacek views border decisionmaking within the context of changing
territorial political behavior growing out of the increasing permeability
of national territories, and the rise of "regionalist" movements.23 These
movements, especially in Western Europe and U.S.-Mexico border zones,
represent a form of "transborder regional microdiplomacy" that may
begin to challenge national foreign policy in the future.
Hansen, the strongest advocate of comparability between Western European and U.S.-Mexican borders, 24 has suggested several important similarities between the two world regions, including: i) both areas have
experienced urban development and economic growth since 1950; ii) as
a result of this growth, both regions require some form of transfrontier
14. See Council of Europe, The State of Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1982); Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Activities in the Field
of Transfrontier Cooperation (1986).
15. See C. Ricq, FrontierWorkers in Europe, 5 W. Eur. Pol. 98-108 (1982).
16. See R. Bath, Environmental Issues in the United States-Mexico Borderlands, I Journal of
Borderlands Studies (1986); J. Alvarez & V. Castillo, Ecologia y Frontera 49-72 (1986).
17. See S. Mumme, U.S.-Mexico Groundwater Problems, 22 J.Interamerican Stud. & World
Aff. 31-55 (1980); L. Herzog, Planning the International Border Metropolis (1986).
18. See U.S.-Mexico TransboundaryResource Issues, 26 Nat. Res. J. (1986).
19. See J.House, Frontier on the Rio Grande 177-198 (1982).
20. W. Cornelius, Immigration and U.S.-Mexican Relations, Research Report No. I, Center for
U.S.-Mexican Studies (1981).
21. Such problems include air and water pollution, transfrontier workers, trade relations, and
economic development.
22. See I. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension of Politics, Within, Between and Across Nations
241-254 (1986); N. Hansen, EuropeanTransboundary Cooperationand Its Relevance to the United
States-Mexico Border, 49 J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 336-43 (1983).
23. I. Duchacek, supra note 22.
24. N. Hansen, supra note 22.
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cooperation; iii) border regions in both places tend to be relatively distant
from the national capitals; iv) there is considerable cross-national labor
migration across boundaries; v) the basic force causing transborder interaction is economic development."
Hansen and others view the boundary as a political line that has become
increasingly permeable to economic relationships that transcend it. Although a vast economic gap separates the United States and Mexico,
Hansen insists that the similarities to Western Europe still prevail: "despite
the relatively great degree of economic disparity that exists in the U.S.Mexico case, there are also numerous similarities to European border
situations." 2 6 This view has been openly challenged by Friedmann and
Morales27 who argue that the Western European model is entirely inappropriate as a comparative framework for understanding the U.S.-Mexico
border region. They take exception to the use of the phenomenon of
economic interdependence as a rationale for transborder cooperation.
Noting that "interdependence" can be a misleading concept, they argue
that the economic linkages between the U.S. and Mexico are hardly
reciprocal. The United States has become the overwhelming beneficiary
of the bi-national relationship. Liberalization of transborder interaction,
they observe, would mainly serve to enhance the free circulation of
international capital, "opening the path for American corporations advancing southward under the pretext of free trade." 28
Urbanized zones along the Western European and U.S.-Mexican borders are not simply neutral spaces upon which a rational model of "transfrontier cooperation" can be superimposed. Planning at the physical edges
of nation states, therefore, must be understood within its unique regional
context. First, planning regions enclose populations not only in different
political communities (not uncommon in the multi-jurisdictional U.S.
metropolis, either), but in different nations; second, planning regions
encompass cities structured within two different national cultures; and
third, because of the border, local decisions have foreign policy implications. While in the past, boundary matters were part of a common
international law framework, border urbanization has generated legal and
political concerns not previously addressed within the international legal
arena. For example, no systematic framework currently exists to resolve
-border problems such as traffic congestion, sewage contamination of
common watersheds, or land use incompatibilities. There is a clear need
25. Hansen, Border Region Development and Cooperation:Western Europe and the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands in ComparativePerspective, in Across Boundaries 31-44 (0. Martinez ed. 1986).
26. Id. at 42.
27. J. Friedmann & R. Morales, Transborder Planning: A Case of Sophisticated Provocation?
(Apr. 27, 1984) (Paper presented at the Association of Borderland Scholars Meeting, Tijuana,
Mexico).
28. Id. at 8.
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to develop new conceptual guidelines for planning in a "transfrontier
metropolis." At the same time, the limitations of transfrontier cooperation
must be understood. For example, national culture must be accounted
for, insofar as nations with divergent economic and political systems
attach very different meanings to urban land and its use.29
Planning along international borders requires negotiation between two
federal governments. These negotiations hinge upon each nation's perception of its overall relationship with its neighbor. Thus, city planning
along the border becomes inevitably intertwined with foreign policy.
Western Europe, which has led the initiative in creating programs of
transfrontier planning and cooperation, offers an example of how difficult
it is to implement planning projects that transcend national boundaries.
POLITICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
TRANSFRONTIER COOPERATION MODEL
The growth of cities in two important international boundary regions
calls for the development of a new research agenda aimed at understanding
the political and policy implications of large scale border urbanization.
New conceptual frameworks are needed to grapple with the administration
of environmental and city planning problems in densely populated international boundary regions. Scholars will be forced to address the changing
roles of international borders in a rapidly integrating world system.
Having entered this emerging conceptual arena, however, one cannot
forget that political boundaries continue to divide national governments,
which still seek to protect their own interests through the international
legal principle of "sovereignty." Bluntly stated, boundaries continue to
be necessary. In the words of one scholar, "a world of sovereign states
is a world divided by boundaries."30
As noted previously, an important scholarly response to the problems
of urban growth along boundaries has been to suggest the possibility of
transborder cooperation between nations sharing large-scale boundary
metropoli and their inevitable problems. Transborder policy-making turns
out to be far more complex and difficult to administer than some observers
might lead us to believe. While some progress has been made in establishing programs for transfrontier governance in Western Europe, a number of serious obstacles still face European nations seeking to implement
these unusual administrative techniques.
One can begin to grasp the difficulties facing those who seek to implement transborder cooperation programs by examining the case of the
Regio Basiliensis, one of the largest transfrontier cooperation projects in
29. See J. Agnew, J. Mercer & D. Sopher, The City in Cultural Context (1984).
30. P. Taylor, Political Geography 105 (1985).
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Western Europe. 3 The Regio Basiliensis is a tri-national planning and
promotional agency operating in the Upper Rhine River Valley region at
the borders of northwest Switzerland, southeastern France, and southwestern Germany. Its jurisdictional domain covers three metropolitan
areas along the Rhine River: the urbanized zones of Basel, Switzerland
and Mulhouse, France, west of the Rhine, and Freiburg, Germany on the
eastern side of the river.
The upper Rhine River Valley is unified by common physical geographic features, language (Germanic), and culture. Yet there are numerous reasons why the formation of a tri-national planning authority
might never work. Historic conflicts in the Alsace region along the FrenchGerman border have long impeded local and national authorities' attempts
to implement serious transfrontier measures. For example, tensions between France and Germany in the Alsace region have resulted in weak
infrastructural linkages (for example, roads, rail connections) across the
international border. France's decision to build nuclear power plants along
its border with Germany and Switzerland near the Rhine River has evoked
a harsh response from environmentalist movements and the governments
of both neighboring countries, and certainly has not strengthened the
cause of border cooperation.32
In fact, although the Regio Basiliensis is a political-administrative
structure supported by three nations (Switzerland, France, and Germany),
Switzerland is really the driving force, both economically and politically,
in assuring the continuation of the transfrontier agency. It can be argued
that without the active participation of Switzerland, the Regio would
cease to exist.33
Having said this, one must acknowledge the accomplishments of the
Regio, without a doubt the leading world model for transfrontier planning.
Among the successful transfrontier projects organized by the Regio are:
the tri-national Basel-Mulhouse airport, environmental regulation programs, and the development of cross-border mass transportation and traffic
planning systems. When one looks at the origins of the Regio, however,
it is clear that the primary motivation of its founders was economic, and
limited to Swiss interests, rather than those of neighboring countries. The
Regio did not begin as a transfrontier policy-making agency. It was formed
in the city of Basel in 1963, at a time when the economic elite from the
Swiss pharmaceutical and chemical industries were searching for new
markets. Some observers feel that the motives underlying the original
31. See Briner, Regional Planningand TransfrontierCooperation: The Regio Basiliensis, supra
note 25, at 45-53.
32. J. Scott, Transborder Cooperation, Conflicts of Sovereignty and Regional Initiative: The Case
of the Upper Rhine Valley (1987) (unpublished paper).
33. Personal interviews with officials in the Regio Basiliensis, Basel, Switzerland (Sept., 1987).
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formation of the Regio were self-serving. They argue that the original
mandate for the agency grew out of the local concerns of Swiss business
interests, and that this approach was modified into a more transfrontier,
regionalist framework only when the original Swiss sponsors realized that
a purely "pro-Basel" approach would alienate French and German interests.34
The earliest key participants in the Regio were the Chambers of Commerce and local industrial interests-not planners and government officials. In fact, there has been some tension between the Regio and Swiss
officials, since the agency's formation.35 The Regio thus served as a
catalyst for transborder business and marketing. Its interests in transfrontier cooperation emerged as a result of its location in a dynamic
production center within a nation that needed stronger cross-border ties
to offset the disadvantages of non-membership in the European Economic
Community.
An important barrier facing transfrontier commissions like the Regio
Basiliensis is that the political structures of the three sponsoring nations
are very different. The more centralized French system allocates different
legal powers to its border provinces than do the governments of Switzerland and Germany. This creates confusion about budgetary powers and
legal authority in land use and other matters that might be coordinated
at the border. Furthermore, both France and Germany have been cautious
about sacrificing the authority of the central government in the interests
of border planning for fear that strong regionalist movements and local
diplomacy might threaten the authority of the central government. The
strengthening of border authorities is viewed by some national governments as a potential loss of sovereignty. 6
The feasibility of transfrontier planning is ultimately linked to the
question of authority. "Transfrontier cooperation" organizations like the
Euregio (Dutch-German border) or the Regio Basiliensis (French-SwissGerman border) lack the real power (both political and economic) to
achieve stable transfrontier relations. That power lies with the European
Economic Community (EEC), the most powerful inter-governmental parliamentary body in Western Europe. The EEC has increasingly distanced
itself from the transfrontier planning debates. In fact, the "frontier region"
question is a low priority concern within the framework of current EEC
regional development policy. The EEC assigns highest priority to severely
depressed economic regions; it currently allocates a large share of its
34.
25-41
35.
36.

Koch, Toward a Europe of Regions: TransnationalPoliticalActivities in Alsace, 4 Publius
(1974).
See M. Andersen, The Political Problems of Frontier Regions, 5 W. Eur. Pol. 1-17 (1982).
J. Scott, supra note 32.
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financial resources to the strengthening of economically less-developed
areas such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece.37
The "borders" that are recognized by the European Economic Community are not those that partition one nation-state from another, but
rather those that separate the EEC from the rest of Europe. These "EEC
borders" will take on even greater meaning if the proposed "Single
European Act of 1992" is implemented. Under that act, the EEC will
finally take a much debated step toward creating an internal European
market, thereby removing many of the cumbersome border controls that
interfere with the flow of goods, workers, and traffic between member
nations. In moving to implement the Single European Act, the EEC has
continued to maintain its distance from the weaker parliamentary bodythe Council of Europe-which has traditionally been the lead advocate
for transfrontier cooperation. Such an agenda is more suited to its cultural
and human rights orientation, according to some observers.3 8
Even the Council of Europe's efforts in transfrontier cooperation have
been strained. In 1980, the Council drafted a resolution called the Convention of Transfrontier Cooperation, which was heralded as the beginning of a new era of formal transborder policy-making. Since then, there
have been numerous commissions and agreements reached on matters of
pollution, transport policy, frontier workers, and trade.39 Yet, not one
major transfrontier project has actually been undertaken since the 1980
signing. In addition, seven of the twenty-one national members of the
Council failed to ratify the convention, and two major powers, Italy and
France, ratified it with reservations.' As one official at the Council of
Europe stated about the convention: "It is very positive that we have this
text, but it has not provoked any real new inputs in transfrontier cooperation, mainly because of national reservations about it." 4
The above illustrates that the existing model. of European transfrontier
cooperation is not the panacea for border planning that some have claimed
it to be. We have seen that a number of political factors constrain transfrontier planning in Western Europe-among them, historic conflicts between neighboring nations, differences in national political systems, the
fear of regionalism by central governments, and the incompatibility of
border planning with the objectives of the EEC. Questions about regionalism and transfrontier relations are clearly going to be prominent in the
discourse within Western Europe in the next decade. Many observers are
37. Interview with M. Locatelli, Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, France (Sept., 1987).
38. R. Strassoldo, FrontierRegions: Future Collaborationor Conflict? 5 W. Eur. Pol. 123-36
(1982).
39. See Council of Europe, The State of Transfrontier Cooperation, supra note 14.
40. Interview with J.Chauvert, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France (Sept., 1987).
41. Id.
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pessimistic about the feasibility of non-central autonomy and regional
governance. They speak of the "failure of regionalism" in Western Europe
due to ethnic rivalries, economic rather than regional consciousness among
decisionmakers, the homogenization of culture through mass media, and
the persistence of national governments in keeping local authorities powerless.42 This suggests that the future of transfrontier planning in Western
Europe remains, at best, uncertain. This certainly constrains the applicability of the European model to other world regions.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASYMMETRY AS AN OBSTACLE TO
COOPERATION ALONG INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
A second factor must be taken into account in assessing the feasibility
of transborder planning: economic parity. Interstate relations are constrained by national economic inequalities, especially when the economic
differences are unusually large. It follows that the success of border
cooperation programs is -at least partly conditioned by the relative economic levels of neighboring countries. In Western Europe, there is relative
parity across borders; along the U.S.-Mexico border such parity does not
exist. The glaring imbalance of income and power along the U.S.-Mexico
border is probably the most obvious deterrent to the formation of transborder cooperation programs.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize comparative population, employment, and
income data for states and provinces along Western European and U.S.Mexican borders. One sees that in both regions substantial populations
reside in the states or provinces contiguous with international boundaries.
Most of the border provinces in Western Europe (Table 1) had well over
one million inhabitants in 1980. Equally, all of the northern Mexican and
Southwestern U.S. border states had populations surpassing one million
in the same year (Table 2). In fact, it is now clear that the 1980 census
in Mexico seriously undercounted border populations, thus the Mexican
figures in Table 2 could be even higher.
Transborder measures of socio-economic well-being (unemployment,
income) for Western Europe (Table 1) and the U.S.-Mexico border (Table
2) diverge sharply. Socio-economic inequality is far more severe along
the U.S.-Mexico border. As Table 1 suggests, income and unemployment
levels do not vary that strongly between neighboring European border
provinces. In the cases of the French-German (Lorraine-Saarland), the
Belgian-German (Waals-Trier), and the French-Belgian (Nord, Pas de
Calais-Flanders) borders, income levels are virtually equal, and only on
the Belgian-German border are there significantly different unemployment
levels. Even along the Italian-French (Liguria-Cote d'Azur), Italian-Swiss
(Lombardia-Ticino) and Dutch-German (Limburg-Dusseldorf-Cologne)
borders, the wealthier nation displays an average income that is only
42. R. Strassoldo, supra note 38, at 126-35.
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TABLE 1
Population, Unemployment, Income for Selected
Border Regions of Western Europe
Border Region
(National Province
or sub-region)

1980
Population
(millions)

%
Unemployed

1. Cote D'Azur, France
Liguria, Italy
2. Lombardia, Italy
Ticino, Switzerland
3. Alsace, France
Northwest, Switzerland
Freiburg, Germany

3.9
1.9
8.9
0.3
1.5
1.0
1.9

8.6
5.7
2.9
3.6*
4.7
3.6*
2.6

4. Lorraine, France
Saarland, Germany

2.3
1.1

6.1
5.1

Annual Income
(Gross Value Added
Per Capita in
U.S. Dollars
10,286
7,089
7,462
10,531
10,864
13,763
10,283

(1980)
(1979)
(1979)
(1980)
(1980)
(1980)
(1978)

9,706 (1980)
9,805 (1978)

5. Trier, Germany
0.5
3.7
8,371 (1978)
Waals, (Liege) Belgium
3.2
12.8
8,283 (1979)
6. Nord-Pas de Calais, France
3.9
8.9
9,021 (1980)
Flanders, Belgium
5.6
10.7
10,016 (1979)
7. Limburg, Netherlands
1.0
7.5
7,984 (1978)
Dusseldorf-Cologne, Germany
9.1
3.0
11,808 (1978)
*National figure
Source: Council of Europe, Compendium of Regional Statistics (Stasbourg, 1983) (Income conversions to U.S. dollar by author).
TABLE 2

Population, Unemployment and Income Data
Neighboring Border States: U.S. and Mexico
% unemployed (U.S.)
% unemployed/
Underemployed (Mexico)2

Annual Per
Capita Income
(1970)
in U.S. Dollars3

Border region

1980 Pop.
(millions)'

1. Arizona
Sonora
2. California
Baja California (Norte)
3. New Mexico
Chihuahua

2.8
1.4
23.6
1.2
1.3
1.9

5.0
/13.2
7.8
/16.6
7.5
/21.3

(1984)
(1970)
(1984)
(1970)
(1984)
(1970)

2,937
619
3,614
622
2,437
351

4. Texas
Coahuila
Nuevo Leon
Tamaulipas

14.2
1.5
2.4
1.9

5.9
/15.8
/11.5
/18.4

(1984)
(1970)
(1970)
(1970)

2,792
499
695
465

Sources:
'P. Reich, ed. Statistical Abstract of the United States Mexico Borderlands (1984) (Los Angeles:
UCLA).
2
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1987). (U.S. data) V.
Urquidi and S. Mendez Villareal, Economic Importance of Mexico's Northern Border Region in
Views Across the Border at 155 (S. Ross ed. 1979) (Mexican data).
3
Statistical Abstract. L. Unikel, El Desarrollo Urbano de Mexico at 179n (El Colegio de Mexico,
1970) (Mexican data).
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about 30 percent higher than its economically weaker neighbor. One of
the most densely populated and economically dynamic international border zones, the French-German-Swiss border area (Alsace-Freiburg-Basel/
northwestern Switzerland), displays considerable parity on measures of
income and unemployment.
These Western European boundary areas also house increasingly larger
volumes of cross-border interaction. Table 3 summarizes data on crossborder daily labor migration in Western Europe. One can see that the
most important commuting zones lie on the Swiss-Italian (Ticino-Lombardia), Swiss-French (Geneva-Ain Haute/Savoie), French-German (Moselle-Saar), Swiss-German-French (Basel-Sudbaden-Haut Rhin), and DutchBelgian-German (Nord Brabant-Anver-Limburg) borders. Many of these
commuting areas are located in what Friedmann and Morales called "the
heartland of industrial Europe, which draws into its arteries cities that
play a global role as centers of financial control, research, management,
and high skilled industrial production." 43
TABLE 3
Commuter Workers by Region, Western Europe

1975
Frontier Region
Ticino/Lombardy
Geneva-Ain Haute-Savoie
Moselle-Saar-Luxembourg
Basel-Sudbaden-Haut Rhin
Nord-Brabant-Anver-Limburg
Nieder-Oberbayem-Voralberg Salzburg
Rhenanie-Westphalia-Limburg
Hainaut-West Flanders-Nord

Number of Transboundary workers
30,200
28,400
24,000
22,500
18,300
16,000

Other

15,000
95,600

Total

250,000

Country of destination
Italy-Switzerland
France-Switzerland
France-Germany/Luxemburg
France-Switzerland/Germany
Netherlands/Belgium/Germany
Austria-Germany
Netherlands-Germany
Belgium-France

Source: C. Ricq, Les Travailleurs Frontaliers en Europe (1981).

The U.S.-Mexico border region (Table 2) displays a rather different
pattern. In 1970, the per capita incomes of most U.S. border states were
between five and seven times greater than neighboring Mexican states.
Employment data display equally sharp contrasts north and south of the
border, although "unemployment" figures are more difficult to compare.
Table 2 lists "unemployment" in U.S. states and "underemployment" in
Mexican states. While the Mexican states had "unemployment" rates of
between 5 and 10 percent in 1970 (the national average), the "under43. J. Friedmann & R. Morales, supra note 27, at 9.
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employment" rates in these states were even more significant. Compared
to U.S. states, Mexican states had at least two or three times as many
workers underemployed, in addition to those not employed at all (unemployment not shown).
Table 4 suggests that daily commuting patterns in the U.S.-Mexico
border region are similar in magnitude to those in Western Europe. These
movements, however, occur under very different socio-economic conditions. Here, citizens of a Third World Nation are attracted by economic
opportunity available in a neighboring post-industrial nation with three
times the population and twelve times the gross domestic product.'
TABLE 4
Mexican Alien Commuters by U.S. Region
1966, 1980

Texas
Brownsville
MeAllen
Laredo
Eagle Pass
Del Rio
El Paso
Arizona
Douglas
Naco
Nogales
San Luis/Yuma
California
Calexico
San Diego
Other
Total

Mexican Alien Commuters
1966'

Projected Commuters
19802

2,032
1,163
2,581
1,604
513
12,046

4,369
2,500
5,549
3,449
1,102
25,899

418
127
1,614
4,234

899
273
3,470
9,103

7,616
9,281
458

16,374
20,000
985

43,687

93,927

'U.S. Department of Labor Manpower Administration, Farm Labor Developments (1968).
2
Based on projections for San Diego region reported in Community Research Associates, Undocumented Immigrants: Their Impact on the County of San Diego 161 (1980).

Socio-economic asymmetry is the dominant feature in the relationship
between cities on the U.S.-Mexican border. The asymmetry is of the first
world-third world variety, and thus, some scholars view this border region
through the lens of dependency theory. For example, writers have criticized the characterization of U.S.-Mexican border relations as "interdependent," arguing that Mexico has become inordinately dependent on
44. Id. at 10.
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the United States along the border, while the United States remains relatively self-sufficient."
Recent research in the area of U.S.-Mexican relations supports this
argument. It has been shown, for example, that the assembly plant,
industrial production-sharing program, or "maquiladora" in operation
along the border since the mid-1960s has tended to subordinate Mexico
to the power of U.S. corporations.46 Mexico has become dependent on
the plant location decisions of United States and other foreign corporations. If labor costs become low enough in another part of the world,
U.S. investors could decide to relocate their assembly operations, dislodging thousands of jobs and income from Mexico's northern border
region. Even if assembly plants remain in Mexico, they have created
neither the backward and forward linkages, nor the management and
technical expertise necessary to generate sustained economic development. Instead, the assembly plant program has led to the growth of
"export enclaves" in northern Mexico, a vast economic infrastructure
that ultimately fails to bring long term development potential to Mexico;
it only perpetuates the nation's dependence on its powerful northern
neighbor.47
A second important example of Mexican dependence on the United
States is illustrated by studies of the immigration phenomenon. A growing
body of literature now shows how Mexican immigration to the United
States is directly linked to Mexico's vulnerability to the U.S. economic
system and to the behavior of American capital. 48 As the U.S. economy
shifts through periods of growth and decline, Mexico's productivity fluctuates accordingly. Low productivity in Mexico may ultimately be caused
by U.S. economic factors. One consequence is that unemployed workers
migrate northward to the United States. Alternately, cyclical shifts in the
U.S. economy drive Mexicans out of the United States during low periods.
Thus, Mexican labor is caught in a pendulum of dependency that drives
it back and forth across the border at the whim of the U.S. economy.
Economic asymmetry, therefore, represents a second important kind
of barrier to transborder cooperation. In Western Europe, political conditions impede efforts to create long term transborder governing structures. While political differences plague efforts toward border cooperation
for the United States and Mexico, economic disparities play an even
larger role. Mexico's historic dependency on the United States remains
45. Rico, The FutureofMexican-U.S. Relations and theLimits of the RhetoricofInterdependence,
in Mexican-U.S. Relations, Conflict and Convergence (C. Vazquez & M. Garcia y Griego eds.
1983).
46. L. Sklair, Assembling for Development (1989).
47. Id.
48. J.Bustamante & J.Cockcroft, UnequalExchange in the BinationalRelationship, in MexicanU.S. Relations, Conflicts and Convergence, supra note 45.
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a driving force in inter-state relations in the modem era. Inequality strains
U.S.-Mexico relations in such areas as trade policy, labor migration, and
industrial development. This severely limits the formation of border cooperation programs.
AN EXAMPLE OF INEQUALITY ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
Border inequality is perhaps best viewed by examining any one of
several metropolitan regions along the border. One striking example is
the Tijuana-San Diego border region. Located at the very western terminus
of the nearly two thousand mile-long border, the region encompasses two
growing cities that are among the largest in their respective nations. San
Diego is a dynamic, affluent, rapidly expanding sunbelt city with an
employment base built around high technology, tourism, military, electronics, and real estate activities. Tijuana is a hyper-urbanizing border
metropolis with growing middle and professional classes, contrasted by
a mushrooming population of poorly housed, underemployed, low-income migrants from rural Mexico. Its economic base centers around
assembly plants, tourism, trade, and services.
Tijuana-San Diego is a functionally unified, but economically and
politically polarized border community. Relations between the two cities
mirror those between the two nations. While the border line separates
two disparate cultural worlds, it is completely porous to long term economic forces that have made Tijuana dependent on both San Diego and
the southern California economy. This is clearly illustrated when one
reconstructs the elements of this northern Mexican city's transformation.
Four important periods highlight Tijuana's evolution from a small cattle
ranching settlement in the late 1800s to a metropolis with over one million
inhabitants a century later. They include: first, the period 1880-1920,
second, the decade 1920-1929; third, the period 1929-1945, and last,
the modem era from 1945-present. Each period of Tijuana's growth
illustrates the heightened sensitivity of the city's economy and structure
to southern California.
The period of Tijuana's initial formation as a town, 1880-1920, coincides with the first important era of North American investment in the
economic development and settlement of Baja California. In the late
nineteenth century, Baja California remained a sparsely populated, pastoral region, isolated from the nucleus of population and production in
central Mexico. Were it not for U.S. investments in cotton production in
the Mexicali valley, farming and wine cultivation in Ensenada, and recreational and tourist enterprises in Tijuana, Baja California would have
remained a remote agricultural region well into the twentieth century.49
49. D. Pinera, Historia de Tijuana (1985); D. Pinera, Panorama Historica de Baja California
(1983).
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As it was, Tijuana's development emerged during a period of land boom
in Southern California. The increase in land subdivisions, real estate
transactions, and new town construction in the United States spilled south
of the border. Tijuana's subdivision and early master planning was financed by American capital. The city quickly took on a North American
look by the turn of the century: the traditional rectangular design plan
found in most Mexican cities was modified in favor of a diagonal, multicentered model, of the type employed in many new towns in the United
States.5" By the 1920s, Tijuana's strong ties to the United States were
blatantly manifest in its physical structure: the main plaza and the highest
concentration of population and facilities had shifted toward the northeast
sector, adjacent to the border crossing into the United States. 5 I
From 1920-1929, Tijuana experienced its first major period of economic expansion. The cause of this sudden economic transformation was
simple: in 1919, Prohibition Laws were passed in the United States.
Suddenly, there was a great demand in Tijuana for outlawed California
"recreational" activities such as gambling and drinking. During this "Golden
era of tourism," economic infrastructure (roads, hotels, wine and beer
factories, racetracks, spas, cabarets) was built at a feverish pace. By the
end of the era, the town's population had grown from a little more than
1,000 inhabitants (1920) to over 11,000 (1930)-by far the largest rate
of change for any ten year period in the city's history. 2 Yet, just as
quickly as the economy and population grew, it faltered, when the stock
market crash occurred and the Great Depression began in the United
States in 1929. This period of economic stagnation gripped the city until
after World War II. During the modem era, 1950 to the present, Tijuana's
population has nearly doubled in every decade up to 1980, a phenomenal
growth rate attributable to the diversification and expansion of ties to the
North American economy. These linkages have taken a number of evolving forms: a steady flow of workers through Tijuana into California labor
markets, with a measurable return-flow of income to Tijuana; increasing
trade relations with San Diego (tourism, retail trade, services); and assembly plant industries linked with parent firms in the United States. 3
Tijuana epitomizes what one border scholar has termed "dependent
space" in northern Mexico.' An important dimension of this dependency
is revealed when one compares quality of life and income. Table 5 gives
income distributions for San Diego and Tijuana. In Tijuana, more than
50. See Herzog, supra note 8, at 93-95.
51. Id.
52. D. Pinera, Historia de Tijuana, supra note 49, at 334.
53. Herzog, supra note 8.
54. Revel Mouroz, La FronteraMexico-Estados Unidos:Mexicanizacion y Internacionalizacion,
1 Estudios Fronterizos 11-29 (t984).
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TABLE 5
Income Breakdowns, Tijuana and San Diego, 1980
San Diego'

Tijuana'
Income Groups
(Annual income
converted to
U.S. Dollars)

Number

%
Total

Income Groups
(Annual
Income)

No income
0300
$
301564
565- 1,032
1,033- 1,884
1,885- 3,456
3,457- 6,336
6,337-11,592
11,593+
Not reported
Total

15,321
2,532
2,748
5,449
11,401
47,732
29,580
10,814
4,912
31,575
162,064

9.4
1.5
1.7
3.4
7.0
29.5
18.3
6.7
3.0
19.5
100%

Less than
$5,000
5,000- 7,499
7,500- 9,999
10,000-14,999
15,000-19,999
20,000-24,999
25,000-34,999
35,000-49,999
50,000+
Total

Number

%
Total

74,605

11.1

52,590
56,219
109,200
94,255
81,015
104,623
62,207
35,920
670,634

7.8
8.4
16.3
14.1
12.1
15.6
9.3
5.3
100%

'Economically Active Population.
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia y Informacion, Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda
1980, Estado de Baja California at 20 (1983).
2
Data is for households in the San Diego Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Census Tracts, San Diego,
California at 269, Table P 11 (1983).

50 percent of the economically active population in 1980 earned less than
$3,456 per year; in San Diego, the bottom half of households in 1980
earned $20,000 or less. In general, there were large clusters of population
in Tijuana earning between $1,885 and $6,336 per year, while in San
Diego the largest proportion of households earned between $10,000 and
$34,999, or about five times the average incomes in Tijuana. This disparity is somewhat softened by lower costs of living in Mexico, however,
these numbers may also underestimate the economic differences that are
masked by the fact that much of Tijuana's population is outside the
"economically active population" category, earning a meager wage from
"informal" activities, such as street vending. A second measure of the
gap between the two cities is observed in Table 6, which offers a simple
indicator of housing and neighborhood quality, through data on household
water services in the two cities. In 1980, only 56.8 percent of Tijuana's
households had access to piped water directly inside their homes; 21.7
percent of households had no running water in their homes. These figures,
which probably underestimate the magnitude of Tijuana's inadequate
water service delivery system, contrast sharply with San Diego, where,
in 1980, there was virtually full water servicing, as only 1.1 percent of
all households lacked complete plumbing facilities.
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TABLE 6
Tijuana-San Diego Household Water Services
Comparisons, 1980

TIJUANA'
Total Private Households
With piped water inside house
Without piped water in house, but in building
Piped water not in house, but in public tap
Without water
No data
SAN DIEGO 2
Total housing units
With complete plumbing facilities
Lacking complete plumbing facilities

Number

%

96,833
55,051
13,163
1,595
26,271
753

100%
56.8
13.6
1.7
27.1
0.8

720,346
712,273
8,073

100%
98.9
1.1

'Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, Estado de Baja California at 35 (1983).
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Census Tracts San
Diego, California at H-I (1980).

2

Both Tijuana's long history of dependency on San Diego and the socioeconomic differences between the two cities have made transborder planning difficult, despite the growing list of city planning problems the two
neighbors share. There has been no shortage of rhetoric calling for transfrontier cooperation in the areas of transportation management,55 land use
planning,56 and environmental regulation. 57 In each of these policy areas,
however, decisionmaking has continued to be made strictly within national
boundaries. Transborder cooperation for the most part has faltered. In the
transportation area, while San Diego built a light rail mass transit system
in the early 1980s, connecting its downtown business district with the
border at San Ysidro, lack of monies impeded Tijuana's ability to build
a similar system that would connect its downtown and river zone districts
with the U.S. system at the San Ysidro border gate.
The two cities face many obstacles to coordination of land use planning
decisions. As a result, incompatible uses of land are typically found along
the border. In the mid-1970s, for example, the city of San Diego designated a wildlife refuge-the Tia Juana River estuary-for a location
directly contiguous with the most densely populated section of downtown
Tijuana. Perhaps the most striking example of incompatible land development is the planning of a large tract of land lying on a plateau called
55. See Metropolitan Transit Development Board, San Diego-Tijuana: One Region (1977).
56. K. Lynch and D. Appleyard, Temporary Paradise? (1974).
57. R. Duemling, San Diego and Tijuana: Conflict and Cooperation Between Two Border Communities, 16 U.S. Department of State. (May, 1980) (Foreign Service Institute, paper prepared for
Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs).
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the Otay Mesa, east of the San Ysidro border gate. Notwithstanding the
good intentions of officials and planners on both sides of the border, many
of the planning decisions made on this plateau were strictly national
decisions. In some cases, the implications of those decisions were particularly harmful to the neighboring nation. For example, Tijuana built
an international airport adjacent to the boundary, where, on the U.S. side
a large scale residential development is now proposed. On the other hand,
several proposed U.S. developments for its side of the mesa were particularly damaging for Tijuana. These included: a state prison, which was
originally proposed for a site lying directly at the new border gate, but
eventually moved a short distance to the north; and a Disneyland-style
amusement park and a Grand Prix racetrack, both incompatible with
Mexico's vision of an industrial and commercial center for the mesa. 8
In the end, the failure to cooperate in planning this tract of land could
be traced to the disparate economies of the two cities (and nations).
Mexico's agenda was to produce employment quickly, and build schools,
housing, and roads. It developed the mesa more than a decade before
San Diego-wealthier and more patient about determining how to use its
land-even began to study the feasibility of development there.
In the area of environmental regulation, planning decisions have been
made largely on a national, rather than bi-national, basis. This is evident
in two important environmental planning areas: sewage control and air
pollution monitoring. Sewage spills have been a persistent problem in
the region, mainly due to renegade flows spilling from Tijuana into the
San Diego region. The most obvious solution lies in the construction of
a joint U.S.-Mexico facility. But proposals to complete such a facility
have been rejected by Mexico, mainly because the construction and maintenance costs (estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars) are out
of reach, and because Mexico believes it can solve its sewage problems
internally. 9 It is reasonable to speculate that Mexico also views a joint
facility located in the United States as yet another loss of control over
its destiny.
Attempts to jointly manage the air pollution problem have met a similar
fate. Asymmetry of resources seems to be the underlying reason why
Tijuana and San Diego find it difficult to cooperate. Recent estimates,
for example, show that in the mid-1980s San Diego county's air pollution
control staff was 20 times larger than its counterpart in Mexico (100 staff
persons in San Diego, 5 in Tijuana), while its budget was 35 times larger
than the one in Mexico ($2.3 million in San Diego, $65,000 in Tijuana)."
58. Herzog, The Cross Cultural Dimensions of Urban Land Use Policy on the U.S.-Mexico Border:
A San Diego-Tijuana Case Study, 22 Soc. Sci. J. 29-46 (1985).
59. Nalven, TransboundaryEnvironmental Problem Solving: Social Process, Cultural Perception,
26 Nat. Res. J. 800 (1986).
60. Id. at 803.
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Transfrontier cooperation has been severely limited in the areas of
transportation, land use, and environmental planning. This does not mean
that all transborder cooperation efforts have failed. Indeed, the U.S. and
Mexico do communicate on serious matters, such as toxic waste dumping,
policing of the border, and other individual issues. Cooperation is more
successful when it is pitched outside of the formal governmental structures. Neither country is willing to concede authority in the formal political arena, but actors in Tijuana and San Diego recognize that the cities
share common problems. The most successful area of cooperation has
been in economic development. 6 Key leaders in the private sector have
negotiated cooperative arrangements with their counterparts in Mexico,
particularly on matters that enhance economic activities such as tourism,
retail trade, and assembly plant expansion. Often, government agencies
will serve as conduits in these private sector negotiations. "Planning,"
because it implies control (over land and property), is not likely to become
an area of cooperative policy-making along the border; economic development, however, is a more plausible candidate for future cooperation.
Unfortunately, such areas as environmental regulation and land use planning will continue to fall largely within national, rather than cross-national, decisionmaking structures.

CONCLUSION: RETHINKING TRANSFRONTIER PLANNING
The urbanization of international border regions in some parts of the
world has produced a new dilemma for environmental and natural resource
planners, as well as diplomats: how to manage the environmental and
resource problems native to densely populated boundary zones. "Transfrontier planning" poses a challenge to policy-makers. Normally, the
institutions, laws, and public policies governing the planning field are
understood within individual national political systems. Along some international boundaries, however, functional metropolitan areas overlap
more than one national political jurisdiction. Planning problems in these
transboundary zones demand a bi-lateral approach. The solutions require
not only rational responses to technical problems, such as transborder
sewage seepage or air pollution, but an understanding of the political and
economic differences between bordering nation-states that may ultimately
impede the coordination of common planning solutions.
There is a great temptation to find hopeful models of cooperation in
Western Europe, and then apply them elsewhere. Yet, the successes of
even the most celebrated of European transfrontier planning ventures
appear to have been achieved largely as a result of unique regional forces
that may neither be applicable to all parts of Europe, nor to other world
61. See Herzog, supra note 17, at 71-84.
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regions. In the Upper Rhine River Valley, heralded as perhaps the outstanding example of European cross-border cooperation and "microdiplomacy," the unique regional attributes of "a dynamic constellation
of local personalities and the economic clout that the Upper Rhine River
has to recruit the aid of influential politicians"'62 allowed transborder
programs to evolve. The regionalist movement emerged because of private
economic incentives that were primarily nation-specific.
Regionalist movements, including those along national frontiers, have
been opposed by European central governments because they are perceived as a threat to national authority, especially in matters of economic
policy that affect the nation at large. In the end, it appears that national
sovereignty still remains as a dominant force in the negotiation of border
urban planning problems: "despite all promising European prospects,
economic policy remains an instrument of national and state governments,
who set priorities according to their own special circumstances. Regional
and geographic units play a negligible role. . . . These are still reflexes
of the dominant ideology of national sovereignty."'6 3
We can conclude, therefore, that direct application of a transfrontier
model from one part of the world to another is problematic. Urban development models in boundary zones are highly sensitive to the politicaleconomic forces that shape urban areas in bordering nation-states. Making
the leap from the Western European context to the U.S.-Mexico border
region thus becomes difficult. The two regions of the world are as different
as they are geographically far apart. The profound economic asymmetry
that characterizes the U.S.-Mexico relationship is the crucial point of
departure.
Cooperation along the U.S.-Mexico border in the traditional planning
areas of transportation, land use, and environmental regulation is impeded
by the vastly unequal levels of wealth and political power that separate
the two bordering nations. The United States proposes planning projects
that are either financially infeasible to debt-ridden Mexico, or simply
incompatible with its objectives. Dependent Mexico is also wary of cooperation, which it translates as loss of sovereignty. Mumme has recently
suggested that Mexico's ability to resist U.S. pressure to step-up domestic
regulation of hazardous wastes along the border derives from its inherently
more powerful position there: the boundary is one place where the forces
of geography make the United States dependent on Mexico. This will
probably mean that along the border Mexico will continue to carry out
environmental planning at its own pace, something Mumme correctly
cautions that U.S. policy-makers must begin to take more seriously.' 4
62. J. Scott, supra note 32, at 21.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Mumme, ComplexInterdependenceandHazardousWaste ManagementAlong the U.S.-Mexico
Border,in Dimensions of Hazardous Waste Politics and Policy 223-239 (C. Davis & J. Lester eds.
1988).
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Mexico's dependency on the United States strongly limits formal cooperation on planning matters. Conflict has dominated relations between
the two nations, from the drawing of the boundary in the mid-19th century,
to the treatment of Indian cultures, northern Mexican citizens, and even
U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.65 This makes it difficult to imagine
that the two nations would cede authority and sovereign control over land
and property to a bi-national government structure. As an ex-mayor of
San Diego once stated: "We need to be realistic. There are two nations,
two political systems. It is unlikely that institutionally we are going to
be able to share political power across that border."'
Perhaps economic development offers a more attractive incentive structure to both sides in making joint decisions, but, while these decisions
may allow more capital to flow into the region, they will not resolve the
"quality of life" problems generated in rapidly urbanizing areas. A systematic transfrontier planning approach, compartmentalized into different
policy areas (sewage, air pollution, transportation, etc.), may be the only
way to truly address these problems, but as we have seen, it is unlikely
that such an approach will soon emerge, a troubling forecast, indeed, for
a region whose cities will continue to display growth rates among the
highest on the continent.

65. 0. Martinez, Troublesome Border (1988).
66. R. Hedgecock in Herzog, supra note 17, at 76.

